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Abstract 
This paper demonstrates how party leaders (frontbenchers) and backbenchers use their 
access to UK Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) to represent the policy agenda. 
Building on comparative research on parliamentary questions and agenda-setting as well 
as taking account of the particular context of PMQs, we argue that party leaders and 
followers draw attention to different kinds of policy topics with the express purpose of 
influencing the government. Based on a content analysis of over 9,000 questions between 
1997 and 2008, our analysis demonstrates how the posing of questions affects subsequent 
agenda, varying according to whether questions come from the front or backbench, from 
government and opposition and from different parties. The findings demonstrate that 
PMQs helps both the opposition and backbenchers draw attention to issues that the 
government and opposition party leadership does not always wish to attend to.  
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UK Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) is potentially one of the most important 
means for the opposition to challenge the government on the major issues of the day. 
During PMQs opposition Members of Parliament put questions to the prime minister in 
full view of the public and expect well-briefed answers in return. However, the value and 
the purpose of PMQs has increasingly been called into question by recent research (for a 
summary see Bates et al, 2012) and even internal government debates (see UK 
Parliament, 1996) contain comments about the shallowness and shortcomings of PMQs. 
As it currently stands PMQs is widely believed  to show off the rhetorical skills of the 
leaders of the main political parties attracting the attention of the media rather than to 
hold the government of the day to account.  
Even though there is a theatrical aspect to PMQs, we argue that the practice can 
still ensure the government addresses concerns that it might not otherwise wish to talk 
about and therefore is an important venue for ensuring accountability and responsiveness. 
As a result of the topics stressed in PMQs, the government has to confront the difficult 
issues of the day, which can advantage the opposition by putting the government on the 
defensive regardless of the completeness of the government’s answers. Due to these 
efforts, the party or parties in control of government respond to other parliamentarian and 
consider issues way beyond what they offered in their party platforms. This practice can 
be observed for parliamentary questions in other national settings (e.g. Green-Pedersen 
and Mortensen, 2010). Moreover, recent research on Denmark and Belgium has 
identified a link between the topics of parliamentary questions and the government’s 
agenda in other decision-making venues (Seeberg, 2013; Vliegenthart, Walgrave and 
Meppelink, 2011; Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011). 
		 ͵
 In this paper we focus on the issue content of PMQs in the United Kingdom (see 
Bates et al, 2012) following similar work on parliamentary questions in other national 
settings (e.g. Soroka, Penner and Bidook, 2009; Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011). By 
examining the effect of government and opposition questions as well as frontbench and 
backbench questions by the opposition on one another we offer a new account of the 
determinants of the parliamentary agenda that complements existing work. Furthermore, 
by employing a large N analysis of all PMQs from 1997 to 2008 we are able to assess the 
general agenda-setting effects of questions over time responding to the call for more in 
depth empirical analyses of PMQs made by Bates et al (2012, p. 24). Our analyses 
demonstrate that PMQs are an outlet for the opposition and backbench opposition MPs 
(King 1976) allowing them to put pressure on the government to respond to issues they 
might rather avoid. As such we throw more light into the practice and impact of 
questioning, adding to recent work on legislatures (Bates et al, 2012; Martin 2012). 
 To advance this argument, the paper first briefly outlines the procedure of PMQs 
for the period of our analyses (1997-2008) followed by a review of the literature on 
agenda-setting through parliamentary questions. The paper then describes the data and 
methods used, before reporting the findings from graphical and statistical analyses. The 
conclusions draw out implications for the study of parliamentary representation. 
 
What are Prime Minister’s Questions? 
Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) is a parliamentary convention whereby the 
prime minister answers questions in the House of Commons from Members of Parliament 
(including the leader(s) of the opposition, in addition to other backbenchers from all 
		 Ͷ
parties). PMQs is perhaps the most public opposition platform given its prominence in 
the media and that it follows a regular weekly cycle. Questions for other ministers tend to 
specialise on specific topics, and other means of challenging the government, such as 
Opposition Days and debates promoted by private members, do not typically get such 
attention and are not able to put the government on the spot in the public glare in the 
same way as PMQs. Overall, PMQs is one of the procedures that reveals the power of the 
institution of Parliament which, in spite of giving extensive powers to the executive, 
gives expression to accountability through opportunities to debate and challenge (see 
Adonis, 1993; Judge, 1993). 
PMQs were first introduced in 1961 to formalize the process of members asking 
questions of the prime minister. Since then PMQs has become a high-profile event in 
British political life as a well as an increasingly public one through radio and TV 
broadcasts (Bates et al, 2012). Since 1997 it has been held as a 30-minute sitting every 
Wednesday while the House of Commons is in session (Coe and Kelly, 2009). PMQs is a 
prominent and dramatic venue for agenda-setting for the government and opposition 
parties that is often noted by media commentators and political satirists alike. However, 
because of this drama the value of PMQs has more recently been called into question (see 
Bates et al 2012 for a thoughtful overview of this debate as well as showing considerable 
evidence that PMQs have become shallower over time). Other recent work has found that, 
despite the theatrics, PMQs do not appear to be off-putting to the public, although many 
MPs are largely ambivalent about the entire ritual (Lovenduski 2012). While we do not 
contest these views of PMQs or these findings, we argue that PMQs still have a purpose 
		 ͷ
in seeking to set the policy agenda and to challenge the government alongside the 
practice of politicians seeking short-term headlines.  
Before every PMQ session members submit questions that they would like to ask 
the prime minister, most often this is a question asking about the prime ministers 
engagements for the day. The questions themselves are chosen by a process called “The 
Shuffle,” a random draw from all submitted questions (Coe and Kelly, 2009). The final 
list consists of roughly 10 to a maximum of 16 questions that are asked dependent on 
time. The list of who will ask these questions is made available in advance to every 
Member of Parliament including the prime minister. Questions from the leader(s) of the 
opposition as well as Supplemental questions from other members called on by the 
Speaker during PMQs are also asked with who will be called on unknown prior to PMQs 
(House of Commons, 2008; Coe and Kelly, 2009).  In practice there are only minor 
differences between questions selected through “The Shuffle” and those called by the 
Speaker. Namely, that the selection of questions from “The Shuffle” is random and that 
the names of those asking questions put forth through “The Shuffle” are known to all 
Members of Parliament prior to PMQs. However, as the factsheet on PMQs claims the 
prime minister is well briefed on all likely questions (House of Commons) partially 
evidenced by the stacks of files the prime minister often consults during PMQs. 
The procedure for asking PMQs is as follows from 1997 to 2008 and is controlled 
by the Speaker. It is important to note that while this is the general order of PMQs it has 
been known to change with a different question other than the engagements question 
asked first, with more or less questions for the opposition and in other ways as the 
Speaker sees fit. Nevertheless, the process we present here matches nearly all of the 
		 ͸
PMQs contained in our dataset. In general, the first question (often stated as “Question 
one”) is selected by a random ballot of backbench MPs. This is a standard question 
asking about the prime minister’s engagements for the day. After this the MP can ask a 
supplementary question that relates to prime ministerial responsibilities or otherwise to 
most aspects of government policy. A series of questions from the leader of the largest 
opposition party follows, followed by a question from another member and then 
questions from the leader of any other major opposition party. The process finishes with a 
series of questions determined by “The Shuffle” and the Speaker’s discretion with the 
total number of questions depending on time. In the period of our data, between 1997 and 
2008, questions were asked by the Conservative leader followed by questions from the 
Liberal-Democrat leader. Normally these leaders were given six and two questions 
respectively from 1997 to 2008 although some variation did occur
3
 (House of Commons, 
2008). Unlike the MP asking the first question and their supplementary question, as well 
as other question askers that follow, opposition leaders are given a degree of latitude in 
the topic and manner of their question asking. This latitude has increased over time with 
opposition leaders questions taking a disproportionately large amount of time during 
PMQs than other members’ questions (see Bates et al, 2012). The Speaker allows 
opposition leaders to respond to the prime minister’s answers as well as to offer opinions, 
																																																								
3
 For this time period the average number of questions for the Conservative leaders was 
5.7 questions with a minimum of 2 questions and a maximum of 8 questions. For Liberal 
Democrat leaders the average was 1.9 questions with a minimum of 1 question and a 
maximum of 3 questions.  
		 ͹
which may or may not be related to the question being asked. While a question is always 
asked, a large portion of the official text can be unrelated to that question and questions 
themselves are often broad, such as rhetorically asking the prime minister to justify the 
government’s existence or mentioning specific and unrelated issues, such as offering 
condolences for a deceased constituent. The questions from other MPs must be far more 
focused and shorter with the Speaker interrupting long questions or highlighting that only 
one question can be asked so as to speed up proceedings with the rate of such 
interruptions having increased over time (see Bates et al, 2012). The prime minister is 
well briefed on all the topics that are likely to arise, but can still be caught off guard 
especially by supplemental questions where the members posing questions are unknown 
prior to PMQs (House of Commons 2008).  
Prime Minister’s Questions like other forms of parliamentary questions is first and 
foremost a venue for the opposition (Alderman, 1992; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 
2010; Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011). The fact that the first several questions are 
reserved for the main opposition party or parties confirms this fact in very clear and 
procedural terms (House of Commons, 2008). However, once those questions have been 
asked the floor opens up and questions from all parties and all levels of political seniority 
are posed to the prime minister. While Cabinet members and other senior politicians 
inside government are unlikely and are even unable to ask questions other members of 
their own party still do. In fact even members of the government’s own party ask about 
controversial issues, such as the Iraq War, providing an open venue for debate as is the 
ideal of the UK Parliamentary system (Adonis, 1993; Judge, 1993). Additionally, 
previous research clearly demonstrates that there are party differences in the number and 
		 ͺ
content of questions (see	Wiberg and Koura, 1994; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010; 
Green-Pedersen, 2010; Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011) no doubt related to party 
preferences (see Adams et al, 2005; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009).  
Table 1 summarizes this process for New Labour government from their election 
in 1997 to the end of 2008. 
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Parliamentary procedure also plays an important role in PMQs. As King (1976) 
first noted, PMQs is an important procedure where opposition frontbenchers, opposition 
backbenchers and government backbenchers all ask questions of the prime minister 
directed at them and their cabinet. These distinctions are important. The Speaker and 
“The Shuffle” act independently of party: the former seeks to allocate questions fairly 
whereas the latter is a random draw. Therefore, salient issues will be underrepresented by 
backbencher questions due to the ability of backbenchers with specific constituency 
interests to gain access to questions (House of Commons, 2008; Coe and Kelly, 2009) 
and as such salient issues will have lower percentages of backbench questions. 
 
Policy Representation and Questions in Parliaments 
Political scientists usually approach the actions of legislators through an analysis 
of their careers and how they represent their constituencies, an approach which has been 
applied to the UK Parliament (Norton and Wood, 1993) and to its parliamentary 
questions (see Bertelli and Dolan, 2009; Saalfeld 2011). But the wider agenda of 
		 ͻ
Parliament might not so closely link to these representative concerns, whereby the actions 
of MPs reflect wider shifts in the policy agenda. Members of Parliament may see 
themselves as representing the national interest even if refracted through the experiences 
of their constituents. How well those interests can be represented in a venue like PMQs 
despite debates over its usefulness (e.g. UK Parliament, 1996) is an open and empirical 
question. Drawing on existing research on parliamentary questions we hope to better 
understand the purpose and effect of PMQs. Regardless of how shallow or conflictual the 
venue of PMQs has become in recent years (see Bates et al 2012), PMQs remains an 
extremely public venue that can have strong effects on the content of the political agenda 
even if the quality of the debate is as dire as popular perception indicates.  
 As with other opportunities to debate, the venue of PMQs may reflect the 
selective attention of its participants and leaders to concentrate on one policy topic as 
opposed to another, in other words to take ownership (e.g. Budge and Farlie, 1983). 
Questions give opportunities for political parties to coordinate responses on the big issues 
of the day, namely members of the opposition parties, which is particularly important in a 
(predominately) single-party system (Whitaker and Richard, 2006). In the case of PMQs, 
what counts is the ability of the opposition party to move the government party or parties 
onto policy topics that it does not want to address. In other words to shift their attention 
away from the issues they own and onto issues they must address because of demands of 
governing (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). In fact, a combination of media 
attention and PMQs on a topic the government does not feel comfortable about could 
help shift public opinion in the opposition’s favour. This relates to the wider literature on 
legislative agenda-setting (Brauninger and Debus, 2009), and recent work also linking 
		 ͳͲ
agenda-setting to parliamentary questions (Soroka, Penner and Bidook, 2009; 
Vliegenthart, Walgrave and Meppelink, 2011; Proksch and Slapin 2010). Other scholars 
argue that the growing competition over issues creates more of an opportunity for 
political parties to use venues such as PMQs and other forms of parliamentary 
questioning to expand the agenda and to challenge the government: ‘increased issue 
competition among political parties provides the explanation for the increase in non-
legislative activities’ (Green-Pederson 2010, p. 348). Moreover, empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the content of opposition parliamentary questions drives the 
government’s agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). Other empirical work on 
Belgium shows that the topic choice of questions is conditional on other influences such 
as issue salience, and more so if it is the opposition party asking questions (Vliegenthart 
and Walgrave, 2011). We should note that unlike models that consider party positions 
and preferences (see Adams et al, 2005; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009), this paper 
focuses on shifts in attention. Sometimes shifts in attention can lead to large reforms that 
may or may not be preference related (see Jones 1994). In other words even the 
governing party’s own preferences may not be pursued until an issue is salient.  
Previous work on parliamentary questions has treated parties as just governments 
and oppositions, in this paper we expand this out to consider the different groups within 
political parties. There has been a lot of attention to intra-party politics in the last forty 
years, some of it inspired by King’s (1976) essay, and other work that has examined 
coalition building and alliances (e.g. Kitschelt 1994; Laver and Shepsle 1996) as well as 
the loyalty of party groups in an age of partisan dealigment (e.g. Kam 2009). Partly for 
this reason we expect the actions of the leadership group in parties in parliament to be 
		 ͳͳ
different from that of the backbencher and to be able to shape the agenda independently. 
Party followers will not necessarily be loyal to the leadership and this can be reflected in 
the questions they ask. 
  We therefore ask, what drives PMQs? We aim to unravel whether government 
shapes the attention in PMQs or whether it is the opposition, and if so what part or parts 
of the opposition, from its different parties to its front and backbench, shape attention in 
PMQs?  
The nature of PMQs and their intended use generates several hypotheses about the 
distribution of attention by party and between party leaders and party members. The first 
concerns the ability of the opposition to structure the policy agenda 
 
H1 Opposition questions lead government questions, but not vice versa. 
 
The number of questions asked on a particular issue varies between the 
government and opposition based on the need for government to claim credit for 
implemented policies, preferences, and general differences in issue ownership between 
the government and opposition parties (see	Budge and Farlie, 1983; Wiberg and Koura, 
1994; Adams et al, 2005; Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009; Green-Pedersen, 2010), but 
the degree of issue salience naturally leads to the most notable differences and shifts in 
attention (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011). Party differences of this sort in the UK have 
recently been demonstrated through empirical analyses of both the Speech from the 
Throne and Acts of the UK Parliament (Jennings, Bevan and John, 2011; John, Bevan 
and Jennings, 2014). By paying greater attention to issues the public prioritizes the 
		 ͳʹ
opposition drives the government’s agenda prompting government MPs to respond 
(Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010). However, driven by their own goals and without 
the need to claim or account for implemented policies, the opposition does not similarly 
respond to the government’s agenda (Alderman, 1992).  
Our second hypothesis considers another important dynamic of PMQs, the fact 
that it provides a voice for both frontbench and backbench opposition MPs. As the 
frontbench for the government in PMQs only consists of the prime minister answering all 
questions with members of the cabinet unable to ask questions it is impossible to test this 
argument for the government as no government frontbench questions are asked. 
 
H2 Backbench opposition questions lead frontbench opposition questions, but not 
vice versa. 
 
PMQs from different sets of actors are designed to react to one another. However, 
it is through PMQs that backbench opposition MPs receive one of their few opportunities 
to put forth their unique interests as well as consistency interests. By paying attention to 
issues other than the most salient issues backbench opposition MPs have the opportunity 
to drive future attention from frontbenchers forcing a reaction (see Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen, 2010). Given their unique agendas as well as constituency interests the same 
effect does not occur when considering the effect of frontbench opposition questions on 
backbench opposition questions (see Fenno, 1978; Jogerst, 1991; Rasch, 1994). However, 
the opposition is not a unitary actor and smaller parties may face more pressure to keep a 
coherent message and hierarchy in order to survive.  
		 ͳ͵
 
H3: Smaller opposition parties’ backbenchers have less of an effect on frontbench 
opposition questions.  
 
In the classic works on British politics, parties have different forms of 
organisation and patterns of central control, which affects the role of backbench MPs in 
parliament (see McKenzie 1955). Such variation in party organization is to be expected 
from the comparative literature on political parties (Katz and Mair 1994). In most 
political systems, including Britain, there are several oppositions, represented by different 
political parties. These parties have different relationships between leaders and followers, 
and also have a specific interest to both the front and backbenchers from other parties. 
Because of this, we hypothesise that smaller opposition parties will vary in the extent to 
which they represent the policy agenda. In particular, their followers have less of an 
influence on the policy agenda than their party leaders. Smaller parties, such as the 
Liberal Democrats, require a stronger hierarchical structure in order to stay on message 
and remain competitive, especially in the UK’s first past the post electoral system 
(Russell and Fieldhouse 2005). Small party groups in the House of Commons may be 
more compact and cohesive simply in order to survive. 
While we offer no further hypotheses, we should not neglect the admitted 
influence of factors outside parliament on PMQs that link to government and opposition 
questions to reflect the concerns of these other venues. Specifically, there is a close 
relationship between the media and the arena of PMQs. For instance, it is one of the few 
legislative venues to get media coverage and interest. Moreover, measures of public 
		 ͳͶ
priorities such as responses to ‘most important issue’ type questions no doubt also affect 
the content of PMQs by often highlighting the very issues the opposition hopes to force 
the government to face. We therefore control for both media attention and public 
priorities in our statistical analyses.  
 
 
Data and Methods 
Prime Minister’s Questions 
The PMQs used in this paper are from May 1997, i.e. the start of the Labour government, 
until December 2008 and are aggregated into totals by major topic per quarter.
4
 A total of 
9,062 questions were asked during this time period and were coded according to UK 
Policy Agendas Project major topic codes (www.policyagendas.org.uk). Each question 
and answer pair was allocated a code according to the content of the question alone, 
specifically the portion of the official text asking a question and not the text responding to 
the prime minister’s previous answer as is possible with opposition questions. This 
process proved straightforward for all, but opposition questions then with the Speaker 
holding each MP to a single, focused question. In the case of opposition questions, the 
																																																								
4
 The time period for this data was chosen due to available resources and based on a 
decision to match data produced by the UK Policy Agendas Project 
(www.policyagendas.org.uk). However, as a robustness check our statistical analyses 
were also conducted from the third quarter 1997 to the second quarter 2007, the Blair 
years. These analyses led to the same inferences. 
		 ͳͷ
question asked at the end of their statement and responded to by the prime minister was 
the question that was coded. Our dataset therefore focuses only on questions and not the 
theatrics and the debate of PMQs. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this was a 
distinctive period in British politics largely reflecting the electoral dominance of Labour 
which was able to push through their legislative programme in successive parliaments. At 
the same time the opposition was not thought be strong, but over time the government 
came to face increasing criticism, especially over foreign policy. So it is a good period to 
test for the importance of PMQs given the dominance of the executive. 
To code all 9,062 questions, a large representative sample of questions 
(approximately 1/3 of all questions) was double-blind coded by two researchers with 
disagreements resolved by the project manager. With this cleaned sample a computer-
assisted software package
5
 was trained and used as a second coder for the remainder of 
the questions with disagreements also addressed by the project manager.
6
 Each observed 
question includes the date, the full text of the question and answer, the topic of the 
question and the party of the questioner. We were further able to distinguish question 
																																																								
5
 See the document “The Use of Computer Assisted Coding for Political Debates: British 
Prime Ministers Questions 1997-2008”, web link withheld. 
6
 The usage of a computer and human coder led to an intercoder reliability of roughly 
80%; however, the difference between using two human and a combination of a human 
and computer coder was negligible and the overall reliability following checks by the 
project manager was far higher.  
		 ͳ͸
askers, namely whether they were a member of the shadow cabinet (including party 
leaders), the so-called frontbench, for the two main opposition parties.  
 
Public Opinion 
 PMQs is one of the most public ways that Members of Parliament can express 
their concerns and represent the views of their constituents as the frequent references to 
them in their questions indicate. Therefore, the issue salience of the public plays an 
important role in determining the distribution of attention in PMQs, particularly for the 
opposition.  To control for the direct effect of public opinion on question asking we 
include public opinion in the models of PMQ attention. Namely, we use Ipsos-MORI’s 
‘most important issue’ (MII) measure. T The MII question asks, “What would you say is 
the most important issue facing Britain today?” These data were recoded from Ipsos-
MORI’s own coding scheme to match the UK Policy Agendas Project’s major topic 
codes. In our models, we treat the relationship between public opinion and PMQs as 
contemporaneous due to the close relationship between current events and PMQs. It is 
unlikely that PMQs themselves influence public opinion as public opinion comes from 
many sources measuring the general salience of an issue. Furthermore, in spite of the 
media coverage of PMQs it does not regularly appear on the front pages of the 
newspapers or as headline news making the effect indirect at best. 
 
Media 
We also use media data gathered from front-page headlines of The Times 
(London) as a further control for issue salience. This date was gathered for every 
		 ͳ͹
Wednesday and was also coded by major topic through a double blind coding procedure 
(at ~85% intercoder reliability with disagreements also addressed by the project 
manager).
7
 Media attention serves to both capture attention to issues due to events and the 
level of media salience related to different issues. The relationship is tested 
contemporaneously due to the close relationship between current events and PMQs.
8
  
 
Statistical Models 
 In order to test our hypotheses we use graphical analyses to demonstrate the 
similarities and differences between the government and opposition agendas contained in 
PMQs. In addition to our graphical analyses of PMQs, we use time series cross-sectional 
models to test the expectation that opposition questions lead government questions, but 
not vice versa. This procedure allows us to understand why the total agenda changes over 
time. The two opposition and government models take the following forms and include 
fixed effects by topic to account for differences in the average change by issue. 
 
Gov’it = Gov’it -1 + Opp’it -1 + Opinionit + Mediait (1) 
Opp’it =Opp’it -1 + Gov’it -1 + Opinionit + Mediait (2) 
																																																								
7
 The choice to sample front pages from every Wednesday was made to as closely match 
media salience with PMQs that occur on Wednesdays during the examined time period.  
8
 The inclusion of a lagged media variable did not alter any of the inferences in the 
transformed results. In the untransformed results not presented here and discussed in 
footnote XX the lagged variable led to positive, but only marginally significant effects.  
		 ͳͺ
 
Where: 
   Gov’it = Govit – Govit -4 
   Opp’it = Oppit – Oppit-4 
 
 In these two models questions by both the government and the opposition have 
been seasonally differenced based on the corresponding quarter in the previous year. In 
other words the number of questions asked by the opposition on the economy in the first 
quarter of 2007 is subtracted from the total number of questions asked by the opposition 
on the economy in the first quarter of 2008. This produces the year-on-year difference in 
questions to account for the parliamentary calendar.
9
 Namely, this differencing accounts 
for the fact that the government does not spend the same amount of time in session in 
every quarter and that certain issues, like the budget often come up around the same time 
each year. The cycles shown in Figure 1 demonstrate both why this transformation is 
needed
10
 and the resulting transformation for all questions.
11
  
																																																								
9
 As the data is seasonally differenced taking on both positive and negative change based 
values the use of time series cross-sectional OLS models is appropriate.  
10
 Despite the strong seasonality of the series the results for analyses on the 
untransformed series not presented here were largely similar with the main finding that 
opposition questions lead government questions but not vice versa staying the same. The 
use of the untransformed series did however lead to a significant effect for the lagged 	
		 ͳͻ
 
[insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
 We also make use of seasonally differenced data in models including fixed 
effects for the internal opposition models and our final model. In these models we 
consider both the frontbench (leader and shadow cabinet) and backbench (all other 
members) for each party in relation to one another.  
 
Analyses 
PMQs: An Opposition Agenda? 
Beyond demonstrating the seasonality of the data, Figure 1a shows that the 
number of opposition questions is higher than the government’s. This result contrasts 
with previous work in the UK that finds a roughly equal share of questions from the 
government and opposition (Borthwick, 1993). From Figure 1a PMQs is clearly a venue 
for the opposition’s voice. As discussed earlier, PMQs is one of the few institutional 
venues where the opposition is given a voice in British politics, which it uses actively 
																																																																																																																																																																					
government questions in the government model and a significant positive effect for the 
media in both models with all other inferences staying the same.  
11
 Phillips-Perron tests for unit roots demonstrated that there is no evidence of a unit root 
in any of transformed or untransformed series. Beyond the aggregate pattern of cycling 
demonstrated in Figure 1 individual series also demonstrated patterns of cycling in their 
autocorrelation function.   
		 ʹͲ
(Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011), partly because the procedure grants several questions 
to the opposition (House of Commons, 2008), so it has opportunities to set the agenda 
 
Opposition vs. Government Policy 
 We now turn to differences in the questions asked by the opposition and the 
government. Figures 2 and 3 present an array of 19 graphs for each of the 19 major topic 
codes used by the UK Policy Agendas Project. In Figure 2 the total number of questions 
asked by both the government and opposition by topic is graphed. In Figure 3 the 
percentage of questions asked by the government by topic is graphed. Combined these 
figures demonstrate the total amount of attention to each issue by the government and 
opposition (Figure 2) and the total share of attention by issue for the government 
compared to the  opposition (Figure 3).  
 
[insert Figures 2 and 3 About here]  
  
 Clearly there is a great deal of variation within and between topics as evidenced 
by Figures 2 and 3. For example, in Figure 2 the economy gradually declines as an issue 
for both the government and the opposition over much of the time period eventually 
leveling out with a static and rather low level of attention. This is followed by the sudden 
shock at the end of the period in 2008 with the start of the credit crunch. However, as 
Figure 3 shows, most of these questions on the economy come from the opposition by a 
ratio of three to one. The lower share of economy questions asked by the government 
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over nearly the entire time period further indicates that the opposition focuses its attention 
to issues that are salient for the public. 
Parliament responds to outside events in other areas as well. Attention to 
agriculture in PMQs is generally low as to be expected from a generally low salience 
issue area. But in 1999 agriculture was at the very centre of UK Politics at the outbreak of 
BSE, which led to the slaughter of a large amount of the UK cattle population. This crisis 
produced a spike in attention to agriculture from the opposition, as seen in Figure 2, but 
there were virtually no questions asked by government MPs on the topic during this same 
time (see Figure 3) again highlighting the opposition’s desire to focus on salient issues 
and challenge government.  
 
Driven by the Opposition? 
 While there are clear differences, especially in the timing and level of attention to 
different issues by the government and opposition, there are many more similarities 
between the opposition and government agendas than the literature on party ownership 
implies. One possible reason for these similarities goes to the heart of PMQs as a means 
for political debate. Debates are of course marked by both actions and reactions with 
topics chosen by one side and then reacted to by the other. Table 2 presents a time series 
cross-sectional analysis of government and opposition questions to explore their ordering. 
The models include a lagged dependent variable, lagged attention from the other party’s 
questions and controls for public opinion and media salience. 
 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
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 Turning first to the government model, the positive and significant result for the 
lagged opposition questions indicates that the government does in fact follow the 
opposition as expected by H1. Furthermore, the government model demonstrates that 
there is little inertia in the governmental agenda as indicated by the only marginally 
significant lagged dependent variable. In other words, government questions tend to 
change quite a bit in their focus from quarter to quarter. This may in fact be the result of a 
government agenda that is determined by both the previous quarter’s opposition agenda 
and public opinion as is indicated by the positive and significant effect for these 
variables.
12
  There is no effect for the media.  
 The opposition model also matches our expectations. The insignificant result for 
the lagged government agenda variable indicates that opposition PMQs do not follow 
government PMQs. The lagged dependent variable is positive and significant indicating a 
degree of inertia in the opposition agenda from quarter to quarter. This is directly counter 
to the government model and indicates that opposition questions tend to focus on similar 
issues from one quarter to the next. This is no doubt driven by the patterns of attention to 
contentious issues discussed above. It is also worth noting that public opinion in this 
																																																								
12
 Inclusion of lagged public opinion in this model as with the opposition model led to 
marginally significant results while changing no other inferences. 
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model has a higher effect than in the government model, which indicates that the 
opposition more closely follows salient issues in their questioning as to be expected.
13
   
 
Deconstructing the Opposition: Front Versus Backbencher Questions 
 The opposition is however quite a broad term and concept. In particular when it 
comes to UK PMQs during our time period there were two important opposition parties, 
the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, both of which had an active front and 
backbench asking questions. Here we consider the internal dynamics of these two parties 
by assessing the effects of front and backbench questions on either other for each party. 
Table 3 therefore presents a time series cross-sectional analysis of front and backbench 
questions for the main opposition party of the time, the Conservative Party. The statistical 
models include a lagged dependent variable, lagged attention from the other side of the 
procedure of PMQs and controls for public opinion and media salience as before. 
 
[insert Table 3 about here]  
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 The low R
2
 for both models is due to seasonal differencing. In particular, by 
differencing the data we in fact remove one if not the primary determinates of questions 
at time t, questions at time t-1, in other words the inherent inertia of questions from 
quarter to quarter. Our original analyses which did not seasonably difference the data 
produced a better R-Squared (0.20 to 0.35 higher), but clearly do not fit the underlying 
data generating process or time series nature of the data due to their seasonality. 
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 The results in Table 3 suggest that the backbench agenda drives the frontbench 
agenda. Turning first to the model for frontbench questions we find a powerful effect for 
backbench questions matching our expectations that backbenchers drive the frontbench 
agenda, supporting H2. The effect for lagged frontbench question in this case also 
demonstrates inertia indicating how the focus of frontbench questions from the 
Conservatives persist from quarter to quarter no doubt driven by the patterns of attention 
seen for the entire opposition in Figures 2 and 3. Backbench questions also respond to 
public opinion indicated by the positive and significant effect and at a noticeably higher 
level than Conservative backbench questions, suggesting that the Conservative leadership 
knowingly follows general public priorities.  
 On the other hand Conservative backbench questions clearly focus on similar 
questions from quarter to quarter shown by the positive and significant effect for the 
lagged dependent variable. Backbench questions also positively respond to public opinion 
as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient. However, these backbench 
questions are not driven by the Conservative frontbench further supporting H2.   
 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 Turning to the other opposition party, the Liberal Democrats, in Table 4 we find 
quite a different relationship. Namely, the backbench agenda of the Liberal Democrats 
actually negatively affects the frontbench. This finding is surprising in that it not only 
suggests a disconnect between the front and backbenches of the Liberal Democrats, but a 
conscious discounting of the backbencher focus. However, alternative analyses not 
		 ʹͷ
presented here which only focused on the Liberal Democrat leader and not the shadow 
cabinet as a whole found an insignificant effect.
14
 Beyond this the patterns of both models 
are similar to those for the Conservatives with both clearly showing inertia through their 
lagged term. In other words the Conservative party is driven by concerns of their 
backbenchers and moves to respond to public opinion; the Liberal Democrats agenda 
only appears to respond to public opinion and possibly negatively discounts the interests 
of their members. 
 
[insert Table 5 about here] 
 
 One question remains then, how do these different elements work to drive the 
government’s agenda? Table 5 presents an extension to the analysis in the government 
model from Table 2. Specifically, it disaggregates the opposition into the front and 
backbenches of both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties. Here, a slightly 
better fitting model, shows that two elements of the opposition positively and 
significantly affect government questions. These elements are the Conservative 
backbench and the Liberal Democrat frontbench offering further, but more nuanced 
support for H1. Conservative backbenchers play an important role in the content of PMQs 
																																																								
14
 The lack of robustness for this finding may be due to the much lower number of 
questions asked by Liberal Democrat MPs due to their far lower number of seats and 
therefore available question askers during this time period. 
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as does the Liberal Democrat frontbench demonstrating both that the opposition matters 
and that different elements of the opposition by party matters even more.  
   
 
Conclusion 
The topics that appear in Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) reflect both the 
general pressures on the policy agenda and the exigencies of party politics in a 
parliamentary system whereby MPs ask questions about the current issues of the day in 
the hope of giving advantage to their parties. But what is particularly noticeable is the 
difference between the government and opposition on key policy areas is not generally 
due to traditional party preferences (with the exception of the labour issue for the Labour 
government). Instead, the opposition highlights salient issues that are to the government’s 
discomfort. More importantly the findings suggest that the opposition’s agenda drives 
government backbench MPs to ask questions on the same topic, particularly when it 
comes salient issues, such as on the economy and defence. Nor do opposition questions 
follow the government’s backbench questions, also demonstrating the agenda-setting 
power of the opposition (H1). At least in the venue of PMQs, the opposition—from the 
start of Labour government in 1997 to the end of 2008—challenged the government on 
issues it did not wish to stress and increased parliamentary attention on these topics as a 
result.  
The procedure of PMQs ensures that the opposition asks a greater number of 
questions. The procedure also produces differences in the usage of questions between the 
front and backbench of opposition parties. The opposition frontbench uses its control over 
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the content of the questions for their own tactical ends often focusing on the same salient 
issues. Backbenchers on the other hand tend to use the questions for other matters that 
worry them or their constituents, which are often mentioned in the content of their 
questions. Backbench MPs from the Conservative party also drive the questioning of the 
Conservative frontbench and the questions asked by government MPs (H2; H1). It is 
difficult to say whether or not this effect is furthered by the observed increase in 
backbench rebellions through this time period (e.g. Cowley 2002), but our findings are 
certainly consistent with the phenomenon. However, the frontbench of the Liberal 
Democrats pays less attention to its backbench possibly employing a stronger hierarchical 
structure in order to be competitive as the smaller party (H3). The Liberal Democrats’ 
frontbench also has a positive effect on government questions (H1). Despite the increased 
dramatization of PMQs over time (e.g. Bates et al 2012) and the general ambivalence 
concerning the ritual (Lovenduski 2012), PMQs still serve a clear purpose in causing the 
government and the most prominent members of parliament to devote attention to both 
opposition and backbench issues. While maybe no longer high politics then, PMQs are 
indeed still political.  
Our results in this paper suggest that at least in the venue of PMQs the opposition 
and backbench Conservative MPs are able to use the venue to shape the policy agenda in 
different ways adding meaning to parliamentary debates (see Adonis, 1993; Judge, 1993). 
The institution of PMQs has procedures that allow both the opposition and backbenchers 
to represent the issues they think are important, but for different reasons. For 
backbenchers this includes the discussion of constituency interests. For the opposition our 
results suggest that the real purpose of PMQs for these actors may in fact be to force the 
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government to attend to a set of issues they might wish to avoid. As in the wider 
European literature on parliamentary questions (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 
2010; Seeberg 2013; Vliegenthart, Walgrave and Meppelink, 2011; Vliegenthart and 
Walgrave, 2011), our results demonstrate a responsiveness of the government to the 
opposition. However, the responsiveness of PMQs is also affected by the institution of 
“The Shuffle” which creates a clear venue for backbench MPs to participate in the 
process (House of Commons 2008; Coe and Kelly, 2009). In summary, the ritual and the 
drama of PMQs, in spite of appearing to be shallow and media-focused, can help 
backbenchers and the opposition change the attention of government. Nevertheless, 
future work would do well to consider if the decline in the quality of debate from PMQs 
has had more dire effects for policy-making beyond the agenda-setting phase. 
		 ʹͻ
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Figure 1: Government and Opposition Questions vs. Seasonally Differenced (t-4) Questions 
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Figure 2: Government vs. Opposition Questions by Topic 
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Figure 3: Percent Government Questions by Topic 
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Table 1: The General Process of PMQs for New Labour, 1997-2008 
 
1. Question submission by MPs with two general types 
a. Engagements Question 
b. Other Questions 
2. “The Shuffle” 
a. Submitted questions selected at random 
3. Question Time 
a. Engagements question with one follow-up question by the MP asking “Question 1” 
b. Opposition questions 
i. Six Conservative questions  
ii. Two Liberal-Democrat questions  
c. Other questions 
i. Questions from “The Shuffle” (Asker known  prior to PMQs) 
ii. Supplemental Questions called by the Speaker (Asker unknown prior to PMQs) 
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Table 2: Government vs. Opposition Question Ordering 
 Gov’it Opp’it 
Gov’it-1 0.070 -0.006 
 (0.039) † (0.071) 
Opp’it-1 0.071 0.265 
 (0.021)*** (0.039)*** 
Opinionit 0.152 0.520 
 (0.030)*** (0.054)*** 
Mediait -0.033 0.032 
 (0.028) (0.050) 
Constant -0.560 -2.669 
 (0.229)* (0.415)*** 
R2 0.07 0.19 
N 798 798 
Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, † p ≤ 0.10,  
N=798 (19 Major Topics (n) * 42 Quarters (T)) 
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Table 3: Conservative Frontbench vs. Backbencher Question Ordering 
 
 ConFrontbench’it ConBackbench’it 
ConFrontbench’it-1 0.171 0.014 
 (0.038)*** (0.022) 
ConBackbench’it-1 0.195 0.197 
 (0.066)** (0.037)*** 
Opinionit 0.317 0.131 
 (0.036)*** (0.020)*** 
Mediait 0.038 -0.009 
 (0.034) (0.019) 
Constant -1.628 -0.639 
 (0.279)*** (0.158)*** 
R2 0.16 0.10 
N 798 798 
Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, † p ≤ 0.10,  
N=798 (19 Major Topics (n) * 42 Quarters (T)) 
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Table 4: Liberal Democrat Frontbench vs. Backbench Question Ordering 
 
 LibDemFrontbench’it LibDemBackbench’it 
LibDemFrontbench’it-1 0.281 0.007 
 (0.039)*** (0.016) 
LibDemBackbench’it-1 -0.177 0.133 
 (0.084)* (0.035)*** 
Opinionit 0.159 0.030 
 (0.024)*** (0.010)** 
Mediait 0.068 0.002 
 (0.023)** (0.010) 
Constant -0.988 -0.169 
 (0.186)*** (0.078)* 
R2 0.14 0.03 
N 798 798 
Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, † p ≤ 0.10,  
N=798 (19 Major Topics (n) * 42 Quarters (T)) 
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Table 5: Opposition Elements on Government Questions 
 
 Gov’it 
Gov’it-1 0.081 
 (0.039)* 
ConFrontbench’it-1 -0.031 
 (0.038) 
ConBackbench’it-1 0.173 
 (0.056)** 
LibDemFrontbench’it-1 0.137 
 (0.058)* 
LibDemBackbench’it-1 -0.000 
 (0.108) 
Opinionit 0.153 
 (0.030)*** 
Mediait -0.041 
 (0.028) 
Constant -0.520 
 (0.229)* 
R2 0.08 
N 798 
Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001, † p ≤ 0.10,  
N=798 (19 Major Topics (n) * 42 Quarters (T)) 
 
 
